Joining me for a live discussion are MG Dean, PEO GCS, and BG Norman, Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team, as we discuss how the US Army selects and develops its vehicles today. 00:00 Futzing around and intro. 02:37 Guest introductions 03:30 What is a PEO GCS and why do we need one? 05:15 And what does the NGCV CFT do? 07:00 Do both teams work concurrently or sequentially? 08:40 In WW2, vehicle procurement went through Ordnance officers to Chief of Ordnance and ASF. But you are a tanker. What changed? 11:18 You have taken the "Functional Area: Acquisitions" career track. What is that? 13:20 Why is "acquisitions" not required for the CFT position? 16:20 Are your organisations mainly military or civilian personnel? 17:30 Why is the CFT part of Futures Command, but not in Austin? 20:10 The old procurement chain used to be purely through the military side to chief of Staff of the Army, the current one goes to SecArmy. Why the change? 22:10 A US Advantage in WW2 was the Army Industrial College. Does the successor Eisenhower School today still do the same thing? 26:00 In WW2, the using arm and the technical arm never settled the question of "who sets the requirements". Who is in charge these days? 30:30 Do you have a guy in Futures command whose job it is to keep track of new technologies which might be useful? 32:28 What are JCIDS and DOTMLPF, how do they work? 35:22 The Operational Needs Statement, and the example of Stryker Dragoon. 37:20 Back to JCIDS and DOTMLPF 44:15 How specific are requirements issued to industry? 49:20 When determining requirements, how far ahead in time are you looking? 52:00 We have a history of failed multi-national developments, but where do we sit on multi-national requirements? 56:20 What went wrong with Sgt. York, and how are such things prevented by the current system? 58:35 In WW2 most tanks took about two years to field. Current standard is 'speed of relevance', but longer. What is an acceptable amount of time between 'go' and 'field'? 1:03:53 Is 'maintaining institutional knowledge' an Army concern, or a political one? 1:06:25 In the three years between selection of MPF and fielding, is there the possibility of changes due to new requirements, or is the vehicle stuck to be delivered in 2022 configuration? 1:12:00 Is field testing using notional equipment (eg a truck with "tank" painted on the side) still done? 1:14:28 At what stage is the 'abort' button pushed to cancel a program? 1:17:13 In WW2 era, the US Army's Arsenals were capable of creating a new vehicle, even prototypes, on their own, then handed the design over to private industry. Does the Army still have such a capability? 1:19:53 What happens if private industry shows up with an unsolicited item? (eg AbramsX) 1:25:47 In a competitive bid, how much 'take it as it is' is there? eg Can the Army instruct the overall winner to incorporate a good idea from the other guy's entry? 1:29:52 Must the Army accept the submission from the lowest bidder, or does it get a bit of wiggle room for superior performance at greater price? 1:33:46 After engineering tests, vehicles go to troop trials. Are these make/break tests, or are they more a 'you're getting this thing, we're just asking you for refinement requirements'? 1:40:25 Do we still do anything like the inter-war "educational orders" today? 1:41:45 How is the level of field contractor support determined in a contract? 1:43:59 What's the warranty on a tank? At what point is it no longer the contractor's problem to fix? 1:44:44 Is the tank as a concept now, finally, dead? 1:46:40 Are we going to be able to rely more on the AI for 'technical' functions to free up the human crews for 'tactical' functions? 1:48:55 How are we going to avoid the information overload problem which is looking at happening with increased sensors/drones/etc? 1:50:50 There is a push/pull between making a smaller tank (fewer crew) and adding more crew for the workload. Where is that balance struck? 1:53:07 Are we going to go away from the traditional tank crew paradigm of gunner, loader, driver, TC? 1:54:15 What did the US Army procurement system do better in the 40s and 50s, and why do we not do it today? 1:56:26 How tolerant are we of failures in testing? 1:58:25 Final thoughts/comments